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# STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

# ELIMINATING THE COMBAT EXCLUSION: SOLUTION TO A 25-YEAR OLD PROBLEM

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL DENISE R. McGANN
United States Army

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#### USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

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LTC Denise R. McGann

Chaplain (COL) John W. Brinsfield Project Advisor

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#### ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Denise R. McGann, LTC, USA

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CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified 5 April 1998 PAGES: 26 In the past several years the militaries have received extraordinary press regarding gender issues. As procedures for reporting sexual misconduct and harassment were found to be adequate, the focus shifted to gender discrimination. Despite 25 years of female integration into the military, why is the Department of Defense (DOD) still struggling with this issue? Would the issue fade if women were integrated into the entire force? Numerous experts and military officers are challenging the efficacy of direct ground combat exclusion. In fact, they speculate such exclusion strains relations between military men and women. Moreover, exclusionary policies serve as a catalyst for attrition and a vehicle for discrimination. If exclusion inflames relations and contributes to discrimination, then it follows that a reexamination of combat exclusion policies with an eye toward changing them is in order. Such a reappraisal is mandated if the Army chooses to be a cohesive and effective agent for national security in the 21st century.

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# ELIMINATING THE COMBAT EXCLUSION: SOLUTION TO A 25-YEAR OLD PROBLEM

In the past several years the military services have received extraordinary press regarding gender issues. As procedures for reporting sexual misconduct and harassment were found to be adequate, the focus shifted to gender discrimination. Despite 25 years of female integration into the military, why is the Department of Defense (DOD) still struggling with this issue? Would the issue fade if women were integrated into the entire force?

There is a great deal of speculation, but few facts, surrounding the impact of the current direct ground combat exclusionary policies. Numerous experts and professional military officers are challenging the efficacy of these policies. In fact, they speculate that such exclusion fuels strained relations between men and women in the armed services. Moreover, these exclusionary policies serve as a catalyst for attrition and a vehicle for gender discrimination resulting in denying women equal opportunity, and therefore, their equal rights.

If exclusion inflames relations and contributes to discrimination, then it follows that a reexamination of combat exclusion policies with an eye toward changing them is in order. Such a reappraisal is mandated if the Army chooses to be a cohesive and effective agent for national security in the 21st century.

#### THE IMPACT OF EXCLUSION

Exclusion breeds discrimination, and in some cases, contempt. By its very nature, exclusion keeps groups separated and shrouds the excluded group in mystery. This view is not new. In 1992, retired Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, who is credited with solving the Navy's race problems in the early 1970s, testified before an Armed Services Committee Hearing that combat exclusion was a key factor in shaping the attitudes of service members toward women. In the same forum, then Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Frank Kelso concurred: combat exclusion exacerbated problems in gender relations.

This makes sense. When one considers that the purpose of the military is to fight and win the nation's wars, then women, who as an entity are excluded from this key military enterprise, may reasonably be viewed as something less than full participants. Women in the military are viewed by a surprisingly large number in a manner analogous to cheerleaders at a football game. Their support is welcome; their full participation is not.

During the 1992 hearing, other Service Chiefs acknowledged the detrimental impact of exclusionary legislation and policies on women. Yet most steadfastly refused to consider exploring the possibility of women serving in combat. As General Merrill McPeak, former Chief of Staff of the Air Force put it: "...I have a very traditional attitude about wives and mothers and daughters

being ordered to kill people...." McPeak himself best sums up this prevailing, underlying sentiment:

Asked by Senator William Cohen if he had to choose between a qualified woman and a less qualified man to fill a combat role, McPeak responded he would go with the man. 'You would have a militarily less effective situation because of a personal view?' Senator Cohen asked McPeak. 'I admit it does not make much sense, but that is the way I feel about it,' McPeak responded.<sup>5</sup>

Does empirical fact or personal opinion drive combat exclusions? And are we intentionally constructing obstacles which hinder women and exacerbate gender issues?

#### INHERENT OBSTACLES

The military has long acknowledged the fact that women leave the service prematurely at significantly higher rates than their male counterparts. It is reasonable to associate this attrition to the backlash that women experience as a result of being viewed differently. Recent research by a student at the U.S. Army War College convincingly argues the existence of inherent obstacles confronting Army women as they progress to higher levels. The research links these obstacles to the disproportionately high number of women leaving the service and speculates this may be due to "burn-out" from the ever-increasing onslaught of such obstacles. But the prognosis may not necessarily be bad:

...The good news is 'male attitudes toward women ... are affected by personal experience with women on the job ... men who have interacted with women peers longer are less

likely to characterize them according to gender stereotype.'7

Familiarity breeds respect. Thus combat exclusion policies appear to encourage obstacles for the excluded group and discourages the acceptance of diversity which the military ostensibly promotes. As Colonel Larry Keeton who served with women in Desert Storm, put it:

The problem most combat officers have is that they are in all male units and never see what qualities women, who are people, intelligent people, can bring to an organization. Women have a sensitivity to change that men fail to perceive. We [men] tend to feel that we have to gut it out. This isn't to say women can't gut it out, but they often understand the human emotion better than their American male counterpart. As a result, they tend to approach leadership issues differently—at least the good ones do. 8

The issue of allowing qualified women in direct ground combat is important for the very reason repealing the exclusion laws on combat ships and attack aircraft was important:

The law profoundly influences both the acceptance and the quality of treatment accorded to women since they are perceived to be distanced from the heart of the organization and its primary mission—achieving units.9

Although great strides have been made since the law was repealed in 1993, the fact remains that women are excluded from the very heart of the military enterprise when they are excluded from direct ground combat roles.

This fact alone does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that removal of all exclusion policies is appropriate for the services. If an obstacle serves a greater good, its continuance may in fact be justified. In such a case, the organization may,

with eyes open, choose to continue the policy with the full recognition that there is an inherent cost in excluding women.

Therefore, if excluding women from combat roles creates an environment in which women are perceived as separate from the first team, not quite full partners, then the question becomes: for what purpose? To this there is only one acceptable answer: women's presence deter mission accomplishment. To explore this counter-position, dictates revisiting old arguments.

#### RECURRING ISSUES

There are four prominent recurring themes associated with the issue of eliminating combat exclusions: combat and non-combat role distinctions; the ability of women to endure combat hardships; the effect women may have on cohesion; and the possibility that women impede deployment. Most of these issues were addressed in a 1993 General Accounting Office (GAO) Report. 10

#### ROLE DISTINCTIONS

Over forty thousand women served in the Gulf War. According to the GAO report:

[Women served in a wide array of jobs], ranging from medical positions to aircraft weapons assembler and loaders. Along with men, women performed generic deployment-related tasks, including setting up and tearing down tents, filling sandbags for building bunkers and burning human waste.<sup>11</sup>

The report concluded that the overall perception of women's performance was "highly positive," that they pulled their full weight and were not shown any favoritism. Despite this, there were comments during the study indicating that perceptions of favoritism existed. However, a GAO investigation found: "No gender preferences were perceived in award decisions or other forms of recognition." 12

Interestingly, the only significant area of concern was the direct result of military policy:

Concerns arose as units implemented the combat assignment restrictions affecting women. For example ... units [that] provided temporary support teams to all-male combat units could not or would not assign women to those teams because the receiving units could not accommodate women or did not want women assigned. 13

#### DEPLOYMENT CONDITIONS

The extent of women's participation in the Gulf War took

America and the world by surprise. Widespread beliefs that women

were incapable of withstanding the rigors of war were dispelled.

Men and women experienced the same austere living conditions,

which included "situations in which women and men went without

any facilities at all."

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One of the larger concerns, women's ability to cope with personal hygiene problems, was also dispelled. Few health problems reported were gender related.

Health and hygiene problems were minor for both women and men, most were related to the desert environment and not gender specific, and had no negative impact on mission readiness or accomplishment.<sup>15</sup>

There was a perception on the part of 29% of the respondents in the study that women received favorable treatment with regard to housing, shower, and latrine facilities. This was generally not found to be true. However, it raises a key point that command policies that result in preferential treatment create resentment.

The biggest issue associated with deployment conditions centered on women's ability to cope with the stress of wartime conditions. Here too, the concerns were found to be invalid. Men and women alike coped with rigorous conditions and stress. The significant stress factors listed in the GAO study were: the SCUD missile threat; separation from family and friends; austere wartime living conditions; absence of mail; rumors; military family policy; and the uncertainty of when personnel would return home. The conclusion, in terms of gender, was that generally there was "little difference, if any, in [the] ability to cope with wartime stress." However, one very important distinction was made.

Women had more sources of stress than men during the Gulf War in part because the Arabic culture forced additional restrictions for American women. Further, it appears that women in the Gulf received 'more scrutiny and harsher repercussions with respect to off-duty socializing, and the media focused attention on the women who deployed to the Gulf.'

#### UNIT COHESION

Bonding does matter! Opponents of the idea of women in combat express concern about the effect females have on unit cohesion. They speculate that the bonding process, which occurs in all-male units, may have a gender dimension that is critical to this process. However, no evidence of disruption in unit cohesion was identified in the GAO study.

[The] mixed-gender units generally reported ...that cohesion ...was effective during their deployment...and was often better (than it was at their home station). 18

Unit cohesion was found to be important and effective during the Gulf War. Further, gender was not a defining factor of cohesion. 19

This GAO conclusion coincides with the personal testimony of other participants in the war. The GAO study shows what psychologists have known for years: bonding is the result of shared experiences.

CPT Carol Barkalow, a graduate of West Point who was attached to the 24<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division that spearheaded the end-around ground attack into Iraq, said she saw a new type of relationship forming between men and women not unlike the one usually described among men. She describes it as 'a nurturing relationship based upon respect and sharing the same hardships'.<sup>20</sup>

Interestingly, factors that were found to disrupt unit cohesion included rumors, false perceptions, and misguided policy. Inordinate attention was paid to the interaction between men and women because of unit policies and rumors. Numerous examples abound. Just one brings home the point:

In one unit the commander required all bunk and recreational facilities to be segregated. He passed out a list of deployed women's names in his unit and told the guys not to mix in any way with the women....<sup>21</sup>

Such extreme policies unnecessarily exacerbated already heightened stress levels and thwarted unit cohesion. Rumors and leadership enforcement of overly restrictive policies "hurt relationships between men and women."

#### AVAILABILITY OF WOMEN

With every deployment in American history, availability of the force has been a concern. But no concern for deployment of a single group has been more prevalent than that of the fear of pregnant women.

The erroneous perception that pregnancy was the primary cause of women not deploying was widespread and deleterious. It hurt the correct viewpoint that women were full participants of the Gulf War Team. The GAO report shows 100% of Army and Navy respondents held the perception that pregnancy was the main cause for women not deploying. The Marine Corps and Air Force were less at 85% and 43% respectively. Similarly, pregnancy was identified as the primary cause for early returns from the Gulf. Despite this widespread perception, the GAO study found that the facts did not support this belief. In fact, the reason for non-deployment was varied. Relatively few were attributed to pregnancy. While it is a common misperception that pregnancy is the primary reason, the fact is that only 8% of women who

deployed were redeployed for this reason. "Many more men were redeployed for sports injuries than women for pregnancy."  $^{23}$  THE DRAFT

This final question remains. If women were allowed to serve in direct ground combat, would they be subject to a draft? There are various, controversial viewpoints on this. The point is that the draft does not dictate who serves in the combat arms, the individual service does. This should never be arbitrary, but based on pre-established criteria to determine physical and psychological ability.

It is important to note that women have not been subjected to the draft in the U.S. only because it has not been established as a necessity. Drafting women almost became a reality in World War II. The bill was passed but the war ended before it could be enacted.<sup>24</sup> The point is that if necessity calls, women will be drafted.

## ARE WOMEN CAPABLE OF PERFORMING IN COMBAT?

In 1993, the laws prohibiting women from assignment to combatant ships and aircraft was repealed and the Secretary of Defense ordered the services to open these vessels to women. Today, the prohibition is strictly a DOD policy, which prohibits women from "engaging the enemy on the ground while being exposed to hostile fire and a high probability of direct physical contact with hostile personnel".<sup>25</sup>

Of course due to the lack of subjects, there are no studies of women in direct combat in the U.S. Military. However, there is evidence from foreign militaries that indicate the ability to perform in combat has everything to do with personal attributes such as mental toughness and the will to survive. As one state representative put it: "it's not the size of the dog in the fight...it's the size of the fight in the dog."<sup>26</sup>

The question then becomes, are these warrior attributes gender specific? Evidence from foreign militaries suggests they are not. Indeed, mixed gender units may have stronger cohesion:

The cohesion in North Vietnamese forces had been higher than that in the U.S. units, and unit effectiveness was hardly diminished by women. 'The deadliest, most cunning fighters I have ever faced were the Viet Cong women'.... Said Admiral Elmo Zumwalt.<sup>27</sup>

The effectiveness of FMLN guerrilla units [of] El Salvador [were] enhanced by male and female comrades in arms. 'When a man was retreating from the front lines and saw a woman holding her position, he would think if she is going ahead, then I have to,' a former female FMLN combatant told an interviewer. 'It happened all the time.'

Gender appears to be unrelated to the ability to fight. Of course, this is not to say all women possess, or are capable of developing, the attributes necessary for the rigor of combat. They don't. Likewise, not all men possess the attributes necessary for combat.

Canadian forces have integrated women into their combat arms and indications are that some women will succeed:

The Canadian forces had opened all combat positions to women, save submarines, in 1987. While only one woman, a lumberjack, had made it through infantry training and her service obligation during the first three-year trial, four other Canadian women had partially completed Infantry Officer's training by 1992 and one was at the top of her class. Canadian women were also serving as field artillery officers and [in] tank crews....<sup>29</sup>

For several years now high ranking officers, despite their personal contention that women should not serve in close combat, have acknowledged "...that women can [kill] as well as men...." It may finally be time to study the prospects for women to serve as full partners in the armed forces.

#### IS AMERICA READY FOR WOMEN IN COMBAT?

A common refrain when this subject is brought up is that the American people are not ready or willing to watch women come home in body bags. It seems the issue of women dying or being subjected to atrocities as prisoners of war may be the last sticking point. Or is it?

American women have been dying and captured in combat since the Revolutionary War. World War II nurses were captured at Bataan and suffered under the Japanese - probably our most ruthless opponent. They suffered the bombardments of Corregidor, as did the men. They suffered the inhumanities. And, they survived.

In the Gulf War, 13 military women were the casualties of combat, and two were captured by the Iraqi military. 31 One was

sexually assaulted.<sup>32</sup> Until the Gulf War there was a concern that having women involved in combat would be traumatic for the country. It turned out not to be so: "the American public now accepts women in dangerous and austere conditions alongside of men."<sup>33</sup>

We have recognized our inability to protect women on the modern battlefield for years. "Women will share the same risk and hardship as their male counterparts in periods of armed combat." When we accepted integration of women, we accepted the reality that women "will be killed, burned, disfigured, amputees, put...in body bags." 35

The idea that a woman's life is somehow more precious than a man's is skewed and passe. All life is precious. Anyone in doubt should talk to parents who have lost a son, a wife who has lost her husband, or a child who has lost his father.

#### ART IMITATING LIFE

The recent trend toward depicting female soldiers, often in direct combat situations, on television and in cinema has been disregarded as "fantasy" by opponents of women in combat. But art has always been a principal tool used to depict the realities, attitudes, and moral conflicts of the age.

Certainly, cinema may be used for various purposes, e.g., to manipulate or gain sympathy for a particular cause. But the public must also be ready to accept the ideas set forth or the

film will fail. A recent popular movie, <u>G.I.Jane</u>, <sup>36</sup> deals directly with the theme of misogyny and its ugly implications. It tells the story of a Naval Intelligence Officer who becomes the first women to attend and complete the Navy's elite Special Forces Sea, Air and Land (SEAL) Training, and eventually has her mettle successfully tested in combat.

The fact that this and other films dealing with women in combat situations (such as <u>Courage Under Fire</u>) were moneymakers is significant. They touched the viewership as plausible. The lead characters were received as credible and the story lines just as believable. New depictions of women replacing John Wayne reflect significant attitudinal changes and acceptance for the roles portrayed. The American population accepts conceptually women in combat. But does the Army?

#### HAS THE PARADIGM SHIFTED?

A paradigm is defined as "the underlying collection of broad, often unstated assumptions, beliefs, and attitudes that shape peoples or organizations views." 37

For those women who have been in the military since the seventies, I think there can be no doubt that dramatic change has taken us into a new era. The level of satisfaction associated with the pace of those changes may vary, but dispute that positive change has occurred is virtually non existent. Gone are the days of happy hour, go-go dancers and stripers at military

Clubs, and (most) other forms of overt sexual harassment, disparagement, and exploitation. One individual interviewed for this paper concluded: "We're a kinder, gentler force, but that hasn't affected our lethality." What is behind this change?

#### MOVING FROM EXCLUSION TO INCLUSION

Air Force Sociologist, Lieutenant Colonel Karen O. Dunivan, explains these changes as an evolutionary process. Her theory is that the military is moving from a traditional combat masculine military, an entirely homogeneous culture which is hostile to outside groups on one end of the spectrum (not unlike the preracially integrated U.S. Military). On the other end of the spectrum is an inclusionary, heterogeneous, and tolerant culture. Dunivan sees the current struggle between the old and new as a paradigm which is incomplete or somewhere between the two extremes. In Dunivan's words we are "at a crossroad."

Dunivan's hypothesis makes sense. The military establishment seems to be moving toward full integration. Female participation in Grenada, Panama, and especially the Gulf War, Somalia, and Bosnia, clearly demonstrates women's ability, dedication, and resolve to serve under all military conditions.

It appears that the military is moving in the direction of inclusion at varying rates. As paradigms only refer to the shared norms, the mechanisms appear to be in place for women to reach their full potential. The climate is changing. The

military's reaction to recent sexual misconduct has been criticized by some as reactionary. In fact, it demonstrates change toward positive mores in which victims are taken seriously and perpetrators held accountable. Dunivan's contention is that the warrior paradigm is slowly evolving from a conservative, exclusionary culture to an inclusive, heterogeneous model. She illustrates this evolution in the following matrix:

Cultural Variable	Traditional Model	Evolving model
Ethnics/Customs	Conservatism, Moralism	Conservatism, Moralism
Enculturation	Combat, Masculine, Warrior	Combat, Masculine,
		Warrior
Laws/policies	Exclusion	Inclusion
Force Structure	Homogeneity	Heterogeneity
Attitudes	Separatism	Egalitarianism
Majority/Minority	Hostility	Tolerance
Interactions		
	•	

TABLE 1

## U.S. MILITARY CULTURE 40

#### PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE

In <u>Ground Zero: The Gender Wars in the Military</u>, Linda Bird Francke concludes with the following: "[within the U.S. Military] the cultural wars will never end." It is a dismal prognosis and one that, on some level, is true. Gender issues will always exist to some degree, but this is not unique to the

military. It is true for society at large. Francke's conclusion discounts the dramatic changes that have occurred in policy and attitude since the Second World War. The sexual tensions within the military have changed dramatically for the better.

Interestingly, the catalyst for that change was the presence of women.

Considering these changes, it is not unreasonable to conclude that we are headed for full integration or the inclusionary paradigm discussed earlier.

More than in the past, men are speaking out about the contributions of women to the total team effort. Increasing numbers of them ... have a daughter, a wife, or a sister in the military and see no reason why she should not be able to go where and as far as her talents and hard work will take her. 42

Time and familiarity are key. As more and more military men work side by side with women, the more accepting they become. The greatest support comes from men who work with women as part of the military team. They judge women by the same professional standards they apply to themselves. Personal testimony of students at the U.S. Army War College indicates there are combat arms leaders who agree with this assertion. Men, who for years doubted the ability of women to perform in combat, have changed their views simply through personal observation. The more our warfighters who have served exclusively in segregated units are exposed to the capabilities of competent women, the more accepting they will become.

This is not unlike the process we observed in the combat support branches immediately after integration in the late 1970s. Initially, tension was pervasive. Sexual harassment and discrimination was, from a female perspective, commonplace. Integration was a difficult and painful process, especially in the enlisted ranks and is attributed to male resistance. But as a result of personal interaction, many of the men who aggressively fought against the integration of women, over time, dramatically changed their viewpoint.

#### LOOKING TO THE FUTURE

As the Army transitions to the future, it is imperative to examine what that force will look like with an eye toward determining soldier requirements and attributes. The Army after Next will be dramatically different from the Army of today. It therefore can reasonably be concluded that the requirements and attributes of soldiers in the future Army will also change.

As the Army moves deeper and deeper into the information age, one thing is clear: just as the characteristics of war fighting are changing, so too will the characteristics of the warfighter change. As speed, agility, and information become the dominant characteristics on the battlefield, the dominant characteristics of the war fighter will be physical strength, psychological toughness, and intellect.

As demands on the individual soldier become increasingly more complex, there will be an even greater need for soldiers of the highest intellectual category. On a battlefield characterized by speed and agility, our soldiers will need to be more adaptable, intelligent, and independent. They will be required to make decisions and act more independently than ever before. They will be required to operate portable, highly technical equipment.

The information revolution will continue to alter our world at an ever increasing pace whether we choose to engage ourselves in it or not. We cannot remain fixed on the third cycle of warfare for much longer.... We must do no less than draw the outline for a new Army whose structure is predicated on the premise that the machine age is past and the age of information has just begun.<sup>44</sup>

But will there be a sufficient pool available? Recruitment of the best and brightest into the combat arms will be critical and is not necessarily assured. Recruitment shortfalls in the combat arms have existed for some time now. As the enlistment age population in the U.S. gets smaller, enlistment will continue to fall off. This will be especially true if the U.S. continues to experience the economic growth which it has enjoyed for the better part of 45 years. Of course, one may assume that some of these shortfalls will be offset by future downsizing in the military as technology continues to replace manpower, but one cannot assume that this will sufficiently offset the shortages. It never has.

Allowing women to serve in any capacity for which they qualify will ease this burden. DOD acknowledgment has been made that conflicts cannot be won without the contributions of women. The U.S. Military has experienced a sea change regarding its utilization of women. One more hurdle remains: that is the authorization for women to fill any position based solely on ability. For years the reasons for moving slowly on this issue were compelling: the viability of women in combat was unproven. When it came to national security, the risk of conducting a social experiment was untenable. Nor could the civilian leadership risk the political fallout of women casualties.

The Gulf War represents the first time we watched collectively as mothers and daughters went off to war. By all accounts they performed superbly. This was the first time we as a nation fully understood our female soldiers were truly at risk. The experience of female prisoners of war and casualties from hostile fire came home on CNN. The American people reacted with sadness that our soldiers had come into harm's way. But absent was an outcry to bring our women home. The old myths were obliterated.

## WHAT'S THE FIX

If combat exclusion is a root cause of gender problems in the military, and if it can not be shown empirically that

exclusion serves a greater good, then it follows it should be eliminated. Currently there is no empirical data indicating women would impair mission accomplishment. In fact the data suggests otherwise.

The U.S. Military currently has no peer military competitors. There is no current threat of war and the militaries are in a period of experimentation. This establishes the time as right for a reevaluation of the combat exclusion.

Such a dramatic step cannot occur without test cases.

Therefore, the first step should be six-year trials for all specialties closed to women. To prepare for this, acceptable physical and psychological test standards should be utilized to qualify all individuals for every specialty. Special training currently conducted to prepare military members for the rigors of these specialities. These programs need to be available for women. Women will fail and women will succeed, just as men do. In the beginning, the numbers of women failing may be higher than is acceptable, just as they were in the Canadian test. However, with time and adequate training, the number of women pursuing the toughest specialties will increase. Only after such a test will the military be prepared to objectively assess women's ability to serve in direct ground combat roles. At that time an appraisal of the program is in order.

#### CONCLUSION

The military is an outstanding environment for America's sons and daughters. Its consistent emphasis on values, character and ethics has resulted in the betterment of tens of thousands of military members. As an American establishment, the DOD has displayed great professionalism in seeking solutions to gender-related problems. But clear evidence belies its complete success. It strongly suggests that many difficulties experienced in the U.S. Military could be ameliorated by simply recognizing all participants as full and equal partners. This is not to say all should be entitled to serve in direct ground combat. It is to say that all who are qualified should be given the opportunity. Qualifications should be based quite simply on demonstrated ability.

It does appear that without yet acknowledging it, the U.S. Military is moving gradually in this direction. Recognizing this and taking steps to manage this change proactively will preclude missteps along the way.

Could such a test be likened to the dreaded social experiment that is so often summoned as argument against opening combat specialties to women? Yes. However, recall that our people's military was founded as a part of the greatest American social experiment: the Constitution of the United States of America. (4,938)

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  - 32 Francke, 98-99.
- <sup>33</sup> Holm, 470. Quoting Binkin, Martin, manpower specialist and author of several studies on women in the military--Brookings Institute.
- Helen Rogan, Mixed Company, Women in the Modern Army, (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1981) 276.
  - 35 Ibid.
- <sup>36</sup> Blockbuster Video Rental Store, interview by author, 1 April 1998, Carlisle, PA. G.I. Jane was their top requested rental in February and March 1998.
- Paradigm Shift?, Air War College Maxwell Paper No. 10, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, February 1997.
  - 38 Keeton interview.
- <sup>39</sup> Karen O. Dunivan, Lt. Col., USAF, Military Culture; Change and Continuity," <u>Armed Forces and Society</u>, 20, no. 4 (Summer 1994).
  - 40 Dunivan, Military Culture; A Paradigm Shift?, 2.
  - Francke,  $\overline{260}$ .
  - <sup>42</sup> Holm, 509.
- Michael L. Rustad, Women in Khaki, the American Enlisted Woman, (New York, N.Y., Praeger Publishers, CBS Educational and Professional Publishingm CBS, Inc., 1982), 228. The whole book deals with this subject.
- The Annual Report on the Army After Next to the Chief of Staff of the Army, July 1997, A-6-7.
- Denise R. McGann, LTC, USA, was assigned as Chief of Enlisted Signal Branch, USA Personnel Command. On numerous occasions I surveyed these statistics to compare to Signal Corp statistics.
- <sup>46</sup> Holm, 470. Quoting Cheney's assessment of the service provided by women during the Gulf War was summed up as follows: "We could not have won without them."

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